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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADMIRAI/l'Y-WORKMEN'S CoMPENSA'l'ION-lS A HYDROPLANE, A VESSEL?Claimant was employed in the care and management of a hydroplane which
was moored in navigable waters. The hydroplane began to drag anchor and
drift toward the beach, where it was in danger of being wrecked. Claimant
waded into the water and was struck by the propeller. Held, claimant is
not entitled to compensation under' the Workmen's Compensation Law, since
a hydroplane while on navigable waters is a vessel, and therefore the jurisdiction of the admiralty excludes that of the State Industrial Commission.
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp. (N. Y., 1921), 133 N. E. 371.
The question to be determined was whether the claimant was injured
by a vessel, for if he was the jurisdiction of the admiralty excludes the
jurisdiction of the commission. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149. The court, in the principal case, points out that the word vessel
has been interpreted liberally and broadly, including any structure used, or
capable of being used, for transportation upon the water; for example, a
canal boat drawn by horses, The Robt. W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17; a bath
house upon floats, The P11blic Bath, 61 Fed. 692; or a log raft, The Mary,
123 Fed. 6o9. On the other hand, although admiralty has extended its jurisdiction in the past so as to meet the needs of commerce, it will not extend
its jurisdiction so as to include the navigation of the air, and an airplane,
as such, is. not a subject of maritime jurisdiction. The Crawford Bros. No.
2, 215 Fed. 269. Since a hydroplane is capable of being used for transportation upon the water or through the air, the court concludes that it is a
vessel subject to admiralty jurisdiction while "it is in the fulfilment of its
function as a traveler through the water, and has put aside its functions
and capacities as a traveler through the air."
APPEAL AND ERROR-CHARGE TO ]URY-PROXIMA'l'E CAus:i>.-Action for
damages for personal injuries to plaintiff while attempting 'to board defendant's car. The car was suddenly started, and plaintiff was injured by striking the rear of a truck parked with a space of 16 inches between the rear
of the truck and the car. Defendant claimed that, as the conductor had no
knowledge that the truck was parked in the street, he could not anticipate
that this accid·ent would probably happen by the sudden starting of the car
before plaintiff was safely aboard, and so his act was not the proximate
cause of the injury. Held, sufficient that he should reasonably have anticipated that some injury might probably result, but judgment for plaintiff
reversed for error in instruction as to proximate cause. Kausch v. Chifago
& Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co. (Wis.), 186 N. W. 257.
This is one of those cases that make the Jack Cades want to kill all
the lawyers and that cause outcries against the courts as tribunals of injustice. The action began (1) in the civil court of Milwaukee County, verdict
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for plaintiff of $2000, (2) appeal to circuit court, (3) appeal to supreme
court, reversed and remanded, (4) new trial in circuit court, judgment for
$6soo, set aside and new trial ordered, (5) second 11ew trial in circuit court,
judgment for $6coo, (6) appeal to supreme court, reversed and remanded.
It may be assumed that if plaintiff is not worn out there will be at least
(7) third new trial in circuit court, and (8) third appeal to supreme court.
And all for what reason? As to the present reversal, because, although the
jury had answered "no" to the question, "Did the plaintiff at said time fail
to use ordinary care for his own safety and thereby proximately contribute
to produce his injury?" the judge in defining proximate cause included the
phrase, "It likewise must have been the cause of the result without any
other outside cause coming in to interfere and produce the result." This
would shut out concurrent causes, which could do defendant no harm in
this case, and also contributory acts of plaintiff. As the jury had already
found defendant negligent, it would preclude also finding plaintiff negligent.
At this day, after the thousands of cases involving and defining proximate
cause, it is certainly a serious reflection on the administration of justice that
a suitor on his sixth appearance in court should find that his action must
start all over for error in definition of the most familiar terms in damages.
the more so since in this case the judge had elsewhere correctly defined
proximate cause, and the facts are so very simple, were so many times
passed upon by juries, and always with the same result. On all the circumstances of this case, could the court find any probability that a different verdict would have been found if the correct definition of proximate cause
which was already before the jury had been repeated here? If not, then
this sliglit change should not have been held reversible error. Legal definition has sometimes been carried to such a complicated nicety as to conceal
rather than reveal meaning, and to become a mere pitfall for the suitor in
quest of justice rather than a light leading to the goal of legal procedure,
justice.
APPEAL AND ERROR-GENERAL FINDING OF COURT WITHOUT JURY NOT

REvmwABLE.-In an action to recover penalties for the viohtion of a certain
federal statute the trial court found as a fact that the defendant company
was not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore not subject to the
act upon which the complaint was based. A statute provided that findings
of the court upon the facts should have the same effect as the verdict of a
jury. The question was whether or not this finding of the court could be
reviewed on appeal. Held, the finding of the trial court was conclusive and
there was nothing to review. United States v. Colttmbia & N. R. Co., 274
Fed. 625.
On appeal in equity, findings of fact made by the court below are entitled
to some weight, but are not binding upon the appellate court. The whole
case is before the latter court,. and it must decide the same on its merits.
Quigley v. Bean~, 137 Ky. 325. In an action at law, findings of the trial
court are placed on the same footing as the verdict of a jury, even in the
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absence of a statute to that effect, and are considered conclusive on appeal.
4 CORPUS Jurus, 876, and cases there cited. Where, however, there is no
evidence in support of a finding the appellate court may set it aside. Hartford v. Poindexter, 84 Conn. 121; Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455. The
converse of this proposition is that where there is conflicting evidence the
findings of the trial court will not be disturbed. Baster v. New York, etc.,
Ry. Co., 214 Mass. 323. An Ontario court denies that the findings of fact
made by the trial court stand upon the same footing as the verdict of a
jury, and holds that the appellate court may come to a different conclusion
and act upon it. Bate11ta111 v. County of Middlesex, 6 D. L. R. 533. Several
American states have by statute provided that in actions at law the findings
of fact made-by the trial court may be reviewed. North and South Dakota
have such statutes. 3 ANN. CASES, 686. The South Dakota court in construing the statute has held that in reviewing the evidence the appellate
court will not pass upon the weight of the evidence, as a trial court may do,
but will only reverse the finding where it is contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence. Randall v. B11rk Township, 4 S. Dak. 337. By the
statute in Washington the appellate court must examine de novo the evidence upon which the :finding is based. Allen v. Swerdfiger, 14 Wash. 461.
In Wisconsin it was formerly provided by statute that upon appeal in a
case tried by a court without a jury the appellate court should review qudtions of fact as well as of, law, and it was held to be the duty of the court
to examine and weigh the evidence and to reverse the judgment if it was
found there was a preponderance of evidence in favor of the appellant.
Snyder v. Wright, 13 Wis. 689. A subsequent statute provided that the
appellate court should give judgment according to the right of the cause,
regardless of the decision below, and the statute was held invalid in so far
as it made it the duty of the supreme court to decide questions as a court
of original jurisdiction. Klei1i v. Valerius, 87 Wis. 54.
BROKERS-COMPENSATION-REFUSAL OF PURCHASER TO PERFORM.-P
employed D, a real estate broker, "to find a purchaser" for his property.
D found a purchaser who was accepted by P, an oral agreement was made,
and the purchaser made a small payment. A week later the buyer changed
his mind and refused to purchase the property. D refused to turn over
to P the payment which had been made, claiming it as his commission.
On suit by P, it was held that D had found a purchaser within the meaning
of the contract and was entitled to the payment as his commission. Jutras
v. Boisvert (Me., 1921), 115 Atl. 517.
· The duty of a broker employed to find a purchaser is performed when
he has found one who is ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms
specified. 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, § 2430, and cases there cited. The principal
case raises the question of when one is "found" within the meaning of this
rule. It is generally held that there need be no binding contract between
the vendor and the purchaser if the latter is ready to perform. Allgood v.
Fahrney, 164 Ia. 540; M cD011ald v. Smith, 99 Minn. 42. And if, under these
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circumstances, the sale is not consummated because of the default of the
vendor the broker is still entitled to his commission. Dworski v. Lowe, 88
Conn. 555. If a binding contract has been entered into between the vendor
and the purchaser, and the purchaser defaults, the broker may still take his
commission. Fox v. Ryan, 240 Ill. 39r; Payne v. Ponder, 139 Ga. 283. But
it will be noted that in the principal case there was no binding contrac't and
the purchaser defaulted. The court quoted from several cases in support
of its decision, but in all of them it was the vendor who defaulted and not
the purchaser. The reasoning of such cases would not seem to apply when
the purchaser defaults. Parker v. Walker, 86 Tenn. 566; Platt v. Kohler,
65 Hun (N. Y.) 557; Simrall v. Artlmr, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 682. On facts similar to those of the principal case it seems to be generally held that the
broker is entitled to no commission. Kronenberger v. Bierling, 76 N. Y. S.
895; Hildenbrand v. Lillis, IO Colo. App. 522; Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304
(dictum); Griffith v. Bradford (Tex.), 138 S. W. 1072. But see Heinrich v.
Kam, 4 Daly's Rep. (N. Y.) 74- This is especially true if the broker was
authorized "to procure an exchange," Lanham v. Cockrell (Tex.), 152 S.
\V. 189; or was to be paid when the property was sold. Pfanz v. Humburg,
82 Ohio St. l; Parmly v. Head, 33 Ill. App. 134- It would seem, consequently, that the principal case is contrary to the weight of authority, and
it is submitted that the holding defeats the intent of the vendor, which probably was to pay the broker only if a purchaser was produced who would
actually consummate the sale or who would so bind himself by contract
that he would be liable if he did not do so. If, however, it can be truly said
that the vendor accepted the purchaser and assumed the risk of his failure
to perform, then the latter's subsequent default should not affect the broker's
right to his commission, and the case would seem correctly decided.
~

C.ARRmRS-DEI.IViiRY Mus'!' BE To RIGH'l' PAR'l'Y.-Plaintiff had in his
emplQ¥ a traveling salesman who turned in fictitious orders on which goods
were shipped by the plaintiff to the firms supposed to have ordered them.
The plaintiff's salesman, by some means not disclosed by the evidence, got
possession of the bill of lading, which he presented to the defendant, and
he having executed receipts in his own name as agent for the consignee,
the goods were delivered to him. Plaintiff "sued for conversion. Held, as
the goods were not delivered to either of the consignees named in the nonnegotiable bill of lading, or to a person lawfully entitled to the possession
of the goods, as required not only by the common law but by §§ 4624 and
4625, G. S., in the Uniform Bill of Lading Act, the defendant was liable.
Hartford Distillery Co. v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (Conn., l92I), n5 Atl. 488.
The common carrier, like any other bailee, must upon the termination
of the bailment dispose of the bailed property in accordance with directions
of the bailor; and no circumstance of fraud, imposition or mistake will
excuse the carrier from liability for delivery to the wrong person. 2 Hu'l'CH.
ON CAR. 739; The fraud may, however, be such that for purposes of d~livery
the impostor is the right party. Where the fraud is upon the carrier, as in
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the case of goods delivered to one under a forged order, the rule is uniform
that the fraud furnishes no excuse. 37 L. R. A. 177 and cases there cited.
Where the fraud is upon the consignor, however, the cases are in conflict.
A typical case is- where a swindler assumes the name of a reputable person,
and orders goods in the name of that person, which are delivered by the
carrier to the impostor. In such a case is the right party the one with
whom the consignor carried on the correspondence, or the person whose
name the swindler assumed? One line of cases holds the right party to be
the person whose name was assumed. Pacific Express Co. v. Shearer, 16o
Ill. 215; Americaii Express Co. v. Fletcher, 25 Ind. 492. Another line of
cases holds the right party to be the one with whom the consignor carried
on the correspondence. Samuel v. Cheney, 135 Mass. 278; The Drew, IS
Fed. 826. The court in Samitel v. Cheney, sitpra, saying, "we think the more
correct statement is that the consignor intends to send the goods to the man
who ordered them and agreed to pay for them, supposing erroneously that
he was Arthur Swannick." The above rule is qualified to the e.'Ctent that
if the carrier, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known
that a fraud was being perpetrated upon the consignor he will be held liable
for delivering to the impostor. L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Fort Wayne Electric Co., 1o8 Ky. II3; 2 HUTCH. ON CAR. 750. And the carrier cannot exempt
itself from liability for this negligence by special contract. In W estem
U11io1i Telegraph Co. v. Lape1111a (Ind., 1921), 133 N. E. 144, money was
sent with the understanding that the defendant could deliver the money to
"such person as its agent believed to be the above named payee." Defendant
contended that it was absolved from liability upon payment to one whom
its agent in fact believed to be the payee, even though by the exercise of
due care the agent should have known otherwise. But the court held that
notwithstanding the waiver of identification the carrier was bound to exercise reasonable care. As the carrier in the principal case was the one fraudulently imposed upon, and it failed to deliver to the right party, the fraud
constituted no defense.
CARRIERS-WRITTEN NOTICE OF CLAIM OF DAMAGES BY INJURED PASSEN-

GER.-Action for personal injuries to plaintiff, who was riding on a driver's
pass, caused by a collision on defendant's road. In consideration of the pass
plaintiff agreed that the carrier should not be liable for personal injury
unless notice in writing of the claim was sent to the general manager within
thirty days after injury. Defendant's claim agent called on plaintiff in a
hospital where he was being treated for his injuries, but plaintiff said he
was not in condition to talk to him. No written notice was given. Held,
the requirement of notice in writing was valid, and there could be no recovery. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (U. -S., Feb. 27, 1922).
After such decisions as So. Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446, 17 MICH.
L. REv. 420, it seems strange that such a question as the present should be
carried to the Supreme Court of the United States; stranger still that it
should be decided with three justices dissenting. That such regnlations are

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

669

reasonable at common law was past dispute, and the Cummins Act of 1915,
which_ changed the common law so as to forbid any lesser period than ninety
, days for giving notice of losses of goods, made no reference to injuries to
passengers. This is natural, for the Cummins Act was dealing only with
injuries to goods. The court divided on the question whether the Cummins
Act showed a changed public policy on the whole question of the period
within which notice must be given. On this the majority held that the
silence of the statute as to cases of passengers was conclusive; that there
had been no change in the policy of the law. The dissenting judges say:
"The Cummins Amendment is the protest of the country against the discrimination and hardship which many federal and state court decisions
show to have resulted all over the country, from the enforcement of such
a rule as to property claims.'' They do not agree with the prevailing opinion
that there is less need of time for filing claims for personal injuries. On
the contrary, injured men are likely to need more time, and the court should
accept the public policy prescribed by Congress and apply it to personal
injury claims. This extension of the operation of a statute by applying
changed policies of law it is supposed to reflect to cases not covered by the
statute is an interesting door to judicial legislation that may not be entered
in this note.
CoNSTI'!UTIONAL LAW-GRAND JURY-SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT Dm~s NO'.l'
WOMEN THI') RIGHT To SERVE ON GRAND JuRY'.-The grand jury which
returned the indictment against the defendant was composed of ten men
and two women. The code provided that the grand jury should· be composed of ten men. Defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground
that the grand jury was not properly constituted. Plaintiff contended that
the Nineteenth Amendment entitled women to perform jury service. Held,
indictment should be dismissed, as the right or duty to serve on the grand
jury should not be confounded with the right to vote. Stroud v. State
(Tex. C. C. A., 1921), 235 S. W. 214
A jury at common law was "twelve good men and true.'' 3 Br,ACK.
COMM. 349. "Under the word homo, though a name common to both sexes,
the female was, however, excluded, propter defectmn se:rns," e.."\:cept where
a writ of de ventre inspiciendo was issued. This common law idea as to the
qualifications of a juror has been universally followed under the American
constitutions. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1. The passing of
the suffrage amendments have, however, raised the question as to whether
or not the common law rule that women were not eligible for jury service
still prevails. One line of cases holds that where a certain class has been
designated from which jurors are to be chosen, and women are subsequently
brought within that class by a change in the law, they automatically become
liable for jury service. People v. Barltz, 180 N. W. 423; Parus v. Dist.
Court, 42 Nev. 229. Other cases, however, have held that women are not
entitled to perform jury service, even though they were subsequently brought
within the class from which jurors are selected. bi re Opinion of tlze ltesG~
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tices (Mass., 1921), 130 N. E. 685; Harland v. Territory of Washington, 3
Wash. Ter. 131. In other cases where jury service is expressly confined to
men, and the question has arisen, as in the principal case, whether the right .
to vote entitles women to perform jury service, the courts have all held that
it does not, on the ground that jury service was not incidental to and a part
of suffrage. fo re Grilli, 179 N. Y. Sup. 795; Harper v. State (Tex. C. C.
A, 1921), 234 S. W. 909. See also the Opinion of the h'stices, supra. The
contention was advanced in these cases that to deny women the right to
perform jury service under the Nineteenth Amendment was contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the cases of Strauder v. West Virginia, IOO
U. S. 303, and Ex- parte Virginia, roo U. S. 339, were cited. The contention
should have but little weight, for here the basis for exclusion was sex and
not color. As was said in Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, "we do not
deny that a state may prescribe the qualifications of its jurors and in so
doing make discriminations. It may confine the selections to males, to freeholders, to citizens, etc. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was
ever intended to prohibit that." This dictum seems 11ound, as the perform·
ance of jury service is not a civil right, but a political right, which is qualified because its exercise depends upon fitness, which is to be adjudged by
the legislature. The cases reviewed indicate that the conflict in the cases
is confined to a question of constitutional construction. Where a class is
designated from which jurors are to be selected, is the class limited to those
who meet its requirements at the time the provision was adopted, or does
it include those brought within the class by a subsequent change in the law?
The former interpretation would undoubtedly effectuate the specific intent
of the framers of the Constitution. But it would seem that where the law
has designated electors as the class from which jurors are to be chosen, and
women are subsequently made members of that class, they should be entitled
to perform jury service.
CoN'J.'RAC'ts-ILLEGALI'l'Y-PRovrs10N 'l'HA'J.' ANY ACTION ON 'l'Ht CoN'l'RAC't
SHALL Bt BROUGHT ONLY IN A CERTAIN PLACE.-The plaintiff brought action
in county R on a contract containing a stipulation that any action upon it
should be brought in the city of Charlotte, located in county M. Independent
of the stipulation, the venue might properly have been laid in either county.
The motion of the defendant to have the cause removed to county M was
denied. Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co. (N. C., 1921), 109 S. E. 362.
The great majority of American courts hold invalid and unenforceable
provisions in a contract to the effect that any action upon it shall be brought
only in a certain place or court. Nute v. Hamilton Insur. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.),
1_74; Hall v. Muhial Insur. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 185; Nashua River Paper
Co. v. Hammermill Paper _Co., 223 Mass. 8, and note, L. R. A. 1916 D 69(5;
Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 Fed. 704. The court in the leading American
case declared that it placed no great reliance upon considerations of public
policy. Nute v. Hamilton Insur. Co., supra. Nevertheless, the rule is usu-
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ally supported on the ground that a stipulation which ousts the courts of
jurisdiction is against public policy. Shipping Co. v. Lehman, supra; Mutual
Reserve Fund L. Ass1i. v. Cleveland W oolm Mills, 82 Fed. 508. This latter
doctrine has been supported loyally. fo.mrance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445;
Jefferso1i Fire Insur. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, foe., 183 Fed. 588; Meacham v.
Jamestown, F. & C. R.R. Co., 2II N. Y. 346. But its soundness is open to
attack. U. S. Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P. Co., 222 Fed: 1006. In a
few instances, where the convenience of the parties made particularly reasonable the stipulation that action should be brought only in a certain place,
the courts have recognized the circumstances as exceptional and have held
the stipulation to be valid. Mittent!zal v. Mascagni, I83 Mass. I9; Daley v.
People's B1tilding, etc., Assn., I78 Mass. 13. The English courts have frequently enforced such stipulations, refusing to take jurisdiction of a case
where the parties had agreed to sue only in a foreign court. Gimar v.
ilfeyer, 2 H. BI. 6o3; Jolmsoii v. Machielseii, 3 Campb. 44; Kirchner v.
Grnban, [1909] I Ch. 4I3. Accord: Dulmage v. White, 4 Ont. L. Rep. 121.
A few cases in America have held that a stipulation like that of the principal case entitled the party defendant to have the cause removed to the
place agreed upon. Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Biggerstaff (Tex. Civ. App.),
I85 S. W. 341; Merchants' Reciprocal Underwriters v. First Natl. Bank
(Texas Civ. App.), I92 S. W. 1098. See also State v. Superior Court, 6I
·wash. 68I. In view of the customary liberality of the law regarding the
right to contract, it is doubtful whether public policy requires that such stipulations be held invalid.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DYING DF.Cr.ARA'l.'ION.-In the trial on indictment for murder, the court admitted as a dying declaration, over the objection of the· defendant, a statement written by the deceased. The only statement made by the deceased prior to the execution of the writing, indicating
that he was in fear of impending death, is found in these words: "If I am
going to die, I want to see my minister." Subsequently to making the statement admitted as a dying declaration, he wrote a note to his friends stating
that he was feeling fine and hoped to be with them soon. Held, the admission of the declaration was error. State v. Brooks, I86 N. W. 46 (1922,
Iowa).
The court in the principal case held that it is for the court to determine
the competency of the statement claimed to be a dying declaration and its
credibility upon admission is for the jury. That the judge is to pass on
the preliminary conditions necessary to the admissibility of the evidence is
generally accepted. It follows that, since a consciousness of impending death
is essential to its admissibility, the judge must determine whether that condition exists before the declaration is admitted. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
1451. And in most of the states it is held that the decision of the court
or judge on this subject is final and conclusive and that with it the jury has
nothing more to do. Tarver v. State, 137 Ala. 29; Fogg v. State, 8I Ark.
417; Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256; Williams v. State, 168 Ind. 87; State
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v. Monich, 74 N. J. L. 522. In Georgia and Massachusetts, however, an
entirely different rule prevails, and it has been there held that while the
question is primarily one for the court, yet, after the evidence has been
admitted, it is not only the right but the duty of the jury to find whether
a proper foundation has been laid. Com. v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577; A11derso1i v. State, II7 Ga. 255; also see note 16, L. R. A. (n. s.) 66o. California,
Iowa and Oregon seem to have followed this rule also. People v. Thomson,
145 Cal. 717; State v. Phillips, II8 Ia. 660; State of Oregon. v. Doris, 94 Pac.
44. Thus the court in the principal case follows the general rule as to this
question of admissibilit:ii and consequently reverses the prior Iowa. decisions
following the Massachusetts and Georgia rule. It is to be noted, however,
that the court cites no authority to support its decision and makes no reference whatever to the prior Iowa decisions.
EvmSNCE-INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.-On a trial for murder the
defense was insanity. A confession: of the accused was admitted in evidence
over the objection that it was not freely and voluntarily made. Held, the
· burden of proof is on the defendant pleading insanity to prove his legal
incapacity to commit the crime and consequently his legal incapacity to confess the crime. Hin.son v. State (Ga., 1922), 109 S. E. 66I.
The opinion contains no discussion on principle. All authorities agree
that the prosecution can rest upon a presumption of sanity until evidence to
the contrary is introduced. There is, however, considerable conflict as to
where the burden of proof lies. One view is that insanity is a question of
responsibility and while the burden of going forward with the evidence is
upon the defendant, the prosecution is, nevertheless, not relieved from proving all the essential elements of the offense, one of which is sanity. People
v. Garb"tt, 17 Mich. 9. The rule of the principal case, and what is perhaps
the rule in the majority of the jurisdictions, regards insanity as an affirmative defense and the burden of proving it is upon the defendant. See note
to State v. Scott, 36 L. R. A. 721, 726. But it does not follow, as the court
would seem to indicate, that because the burden is upon the defendant to
prove insanity as a defense it is likewise incumbent upon him to prove a
legal incapacity to confess the crime. The general rule is that a confession
of guilt is admissible against the accused only when freely and voluntarily
made. The ordinary presumption is said to be that it was so made. Campbell v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 595; contra, Godait v. State, 179 Ala. 27. When
it appears prima facie that the confession was voluntary, the burden of going
forward with the evidence upon this issue of voluntariness is upon the
defendant. Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38. The rule fixing the burden of proof
is iJl dispute. I WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 860. The rule in England and
most American jurisdictions is that the burden is upon the prosecution to
show the confession to have been voluntary. The King v. Voisin, [1918] l
K. B. 531; Lindsay v. State, so L. R. A. (n. s.) 1077, 1o81. The rule in
Georgia is contra and places on the defendant the burden of proving that a
confession made by him is not free and voluntary. Eberhart v. State, 47
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Ga. 598. There is a distinction to be noted between insanity as a defense
and as going to the free and voluntary character of a confession. It is quite
conceivable that the defendant may have been in full possession of his faculties at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed, yet have
become insane before making the confession. Had the defendant in the
principal case been proved to have been insane at the time the confession
was made the question w:ould then have arisen whether the insanity went
to the free and voluntary character of the confession so as to render it
inadmissible. No case on this bare point appears to have been decided, but
it would seem best to dispose of it by analogy to a case of intoxication,
treating the extent of the insanity and its effect upon the mind as questions
to be submitted to the jury along with the confession, to be considered by
them in determining its weight. See note to Lindsay v. State, supra.
EVIDENCE-NOT ERROR FOR PROSECUTOR 'tO WITHDRAW "\V'.l:TNESS AND PRIVATE!.¥ REFRESH Hrs R:ecoLLECTION.-ln a criminal prosecution a witness
who had testified before the grand jury manifested a hazy recollection. The
prosecutor was permitted to withdraw the witness and refresh her memory
as to her previous testimony. No actual prejudice appearing, it was held
not to be error. State v. Henson (Mo., 1921), 234 S. W. 832.
It is well settled that previous testimony may be used to refresh a witness's recollection. State v. Martin, 94 N. J. L. 139; I WrGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 737. The prior testimony, however, should not be read in the presence of the jury. State v. Walters, 145 La. 209; Kirkland v. State, 86 Tex.
Cr. R. 595; State v. DePriest (Mo.), 232 S. W. 83. The regular method of
refreshing the witness's memory in this way, as is stated in the principal
case, ill to withdraw the jury. With the privileges which the law gives by
way of various methods of stimulating the recollection of_ a witness while
on the witness stand, there would seem to be no reason except a sinister
one for withdrawing a witness to refresh recollection. The method adopted
in the instant case lends itself too conveniently to the coaching of an unscrupulous witness by an unscrupulous attorney not te be viewed with suspicion.
It would not be surprising to find an appellate court presuming prejudice
and directing a new trial.
EvrnENCE-OPINroN BY AN ExPERT WITNESS ON "THE VERY Issu.:e"
INADMISSIBLE.-In a dentistry malpractice case the testimony of a family
physician, who saw the operation complained of, that it was unskillful, was
admitted. Held, reversible error as invading the jury's province. Patterson
v. Howe (Ore., 1922), 202 Pac. 225.
"\Vhile a general rule e.'Ccluding opinion evidence may have been desirable, it was inevitable that there should result a relaxation necessitated by
the practical conditions under which trials are had. It frequently happens
in practice that the "facts whicJt surround a question are so complicated or
so technical that the jury may not be able to grasp them or draw the proper
inference. The principle, then, upon which opinion evidence by experts
became admissible was assistance to the jury. The limit upon this admissi-

MICHIGAN LAW REVJEW
bility, according to one view, was whether or not the opinion was expressed
upon the exact question which the jury was required to decide. If it was,
the evidence was inadmissible. Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464 The principal
case affirms this rule and there is authority for the decision in Lehman v.
Knott (Ore., 1921), lg6 Pac. 476, and in Pointer v. Klamath Falls Land Co.,
59 Ore. 438, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1076. The reason of the rule is that such
opinions usurp the functions of the jury. The court observed that if the
jury believed the testimony of the witness and had confidence in his judgment then nothing remained for it to do except to determine what the amount
of the damages should be. Where the only practicable method of making
proof of the fact in issue is by means of opinion evidence, it is doubtful
whether the Oregon court would adhere to the doctrine of the principal case.
See Lehmati v. Knott, supra. Many cases have held that opinion evidence
may be given upon the very issue. Amrrican Agricultural Chemical Society
v. Hoga1i, 213 Fed. 416; Cook v. Doud Sons & Co., 147 Wis. 271; Poole v.
Dean, 152 Mass. 589; Taylor v. Kidd, 72 Wash. 18. See also 20 MICH. L.
~.36o.

!NNKEEPtts-L1ABILI'tY 'to ONJ~ WHo RJ>soR'tS To INN FOR UNLAWRJL
PURPOSE.-Plaintiff on invitation of a guest was going to the latter's room
at defendant's inn to play cards for money. The elevator was in a dark
place and the door to the: shaft was open while the carriage was on another
floor. For injuries received from stepping through the door and falling
nine or ten feet down the shaft plaintiff sued defendant innkeeper. Held,
that one entering an inn for an unlawful purpose is not an invitee, but a
mere trespasser to whom the innkeeper owes no duty except not to wilfully
or wantonly injure him. Jones v. Bland (N. C., 1921), 108 S. E. 344.
It has been held that an innkeeper is not liable as such for money deposited with the night clerk by one who took a room at the inn for the night
for an unlawful purpose. Ciertis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4- The instant case
extends this rule to one invited to the inn by a guest, not as to the loss of
money or property, as to which defendant would of course not be an innkeeper even if the purpose of the visit were lawful, but as to the care owed
such an invitee for his personal safety, as to which the innkeeper's liability
does not differ from that to a guest. It would seem that a guest, or his
invitee, becomes a trespasser when he enters the inn for any unlawful purpose. The recent case of Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett (Ga. App., 1921),
108 S. E. 309, puts a proper limit on the innkeeper in holding that he acts
at his peril in entering a room occupied by one registered as a guest in order
to determine whether the occupant is there for a lawful purpose.

!NSURANCE-DEA'l'H BY SUNSTROKE IS Accm:EN'tAL.-Plaintiff sued as
beneficiary under a policy of insurance issued by defenoant company to the
plaintiff's deceased husband, insuring him against "loss resulting from bodily
injuries effected directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes,
through accidental means." The insured was overcome by sunstroke while
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returning on foot from a mining claim, and died as a result. Held, that
death by sunstroke was accidental within the meaning of the policy. Richards v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (Utah, 1921), 200 Pac. 1017.
The court seems to rest its decision on the ground that sunstroke is
popularly considered as an accident, and, although technically it is a disease,
the words in an insurance policy must be understood in their plain, ordinary
and popular sense rather than their scientific meaning. And since the words
must have been considered in their ordinary popular sense by the insured
when he took out the policy, their meaning must be held to be the same when
the policy is sued on. The authorities are not in harmony on this question,
but there seems to be a tendency in the later decisions to hold that death
by sunstroke is accidental. In Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers Assurance
Co., 3 Ell. & Ell. 478, it was held that sunstroke was a disease, and hence
there could be no recovery under a policy insuring against accident. This
case was followed in Cont. Cas. Co. v. Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, where it was
held that sunstroke incurred while insured was performing his ordinary
duties as fireman on a locomotive was not an accident. To the same effect
is Dozier v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N. Y., 461 Fed. 446. In accord with the
principal case are Bryant v. Cont. Cas. Co., 107 Tex. 582; Higgitis v. Midland
Cas. Co., 281 Ill. 431, and Railway Oflicials v. Johnson, 109 Ky. 261. Jolmso1i
v. Fidelity and Gas. Ca. of N. Y., 184 Mich. 4o6, is in accord on principle,
although the facts were somewhat different. In that case it was held that
death as a result of ptomaine poisoning is covered by an accident policy
providing for payment in case insured comes to his death as a result of an
accident. See also a note in L. R. A. 1916 E 957. The Higgins case, supra,
is commented on in 16 MICH. L. REv. 453, and 13 ILL. L. Rsv. 133.
IN'l'ERS'l'A'l'e COMMER.CE Co~o.r1ss10N-PowER OVER IN'l'RAS'l.'A'l'E RA'rr:s.Acting under the Transportation Act of 1920, ,the Interstate Commerce
Commission ordered the railroads in a group, of which the Wisconsin roads
were a part, to increase freight and passenger rates to a point considerably
above rates allowed on intrastate traffic. Thereupon the carriers applied to
the Wisconsin Railroad Commission for corresponding increases. That commission denied any increases in passenger fares on the ground that the
state statute limited such fares to two cents a mile. From an interlocutory
injunction granted to the railroads to enjoin the state commission from
interfering with the maintenance of the fares ordered by the Interstate
Commerce Commission the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States on appeal. Held, that the passenger fares limited by the Wisconsin statute are an "undue, unreasonable and unjust discrimination against
interstate and foreign commerce" under the Transportation Act of 1920,
which may be removed by the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Railroad Commi.ssio1~ of Wisconsin v. C., B. & Q. R. Co. (U. S., Feb.
27, 1922).
This case, known as Wisconsin Passenger Fares, 59 I. C. C. 391, and a
New York case decided the same day, State of New York v. U. S. et al.,
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which was an outgrowth of what is known as E:i: parte 74 Increased Rates,
58 I. C. C. 220, are the logical development of Tlze Illinois Central Case,
245 U. S. 493, 16 MICH. L. REY. 379. In the last mentioned note it was said
that the Illinois Central Case is evidently not the last, but the war delayed
for some years the issue which now again arises between the states and the
federal government. The present case expressly denies that the decision
involves giving the federal commission general regul!ltion of intrastate commerce, but does reiterate the view of the Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S.
352, 399, that the power to regulate interstate commerce "is not to be denied
or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations."
So far, at least, as concerns rates it would seem there is practically no right
left in the state which may not be considered by Congress as affecting interstate commerce, and so subject to federal control. Specifically, the court
decides, first, that the order of the commission is much wider than the
orders in the Shreveport and Illinois Central cases, in that it includes all
rates and fares in the states. It was a: horizontal increase of them all. Such
an order "should not be given precedence over a state rate statute, otherwise valid, unless, and except so far as, it conforms to a high standard of
certainty," quoting from the Illinois Central case. The intrastate fares as
a whole were found to be an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, for they so reduced the revenue necessary to yield a fair return to
the companies as to require a heavy increase in interstate rates to offset this
loss. The lower the intrastate the higher the interstate rates must be. The
court therefore upholds the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to order the increase of intrastate rates, and leaves it to a conference between
that commission and the state commission to make necessary adjustments
modifying the horizontal increase. The Transportation Act of 1920 so construed marks another long step in the extension of federal and the restriction
of state control of agencies of nation-wide activity, and it has already drawn
vigorous protest from. those who are jealous for local power of control. The
decision makes a conspicuous effort to show that tliere does remain a sphere
in intrastate commerce that cannot be entered, or at least completely occupied,
by the federal control. It is, however, too restricted to furnish much comfort to state commissions.
LAW OF NATIONS-EFFECT OF WAR ON CoNTRACl'S.-In June, 1914, the
plaintiff, a citizen of the United States residing in Ohio, contracted with
his son-in-law, Meyer, a German citizen then residing in Ohio, to support
the latter's children during his absence. Meyer and his wife went to Germany. When war broke out Meyer entered the German army and remained
abroad until the close of the war. Under Trading with the Enemy Act,
October 6, 1917, which made it unlawful to trade with the enemy except
under license from the President, "to trade" included "(c) Enter into,
carry on, complete or perform any contract, agreement or obligation." Subsequent to this date plaintiff continued to perform the agreement without
license from the President. Claim was made against assets of :i'i~eyer in the
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hands of the Alien Property Custodian. Held, that so much of claim as
accrued subsequent to the passage of the act cannot be allowed. Springer v.
(iarva11, 276 Fed. 595.
An early writer on international law intimated that the declaration of
war put an end to all agreements between subjects of enemy states. GROTIUS,
DE JuRE BELLI sr PAcis, III, ch. 23, 11 5. Dictum of Kent is to the same
effect. Griswold v. Waddington (N. Y.), 16 Johns. 438. Judge Story used
language equally broad. The Julia, 8 Cr. 194. The cases, however, have not
supported such opinions. Kershaw v. Kelsey, IOO Mass. 561 (President's
proclamation during Civil War which forbade "commercial intercourse"
with the enemy, not violated by a lease of Mississippi lands). But contract;
involving commercial intercourse or communication with the enemy are
made illegal by the mere operation of the laws of war. The Hoop, l C.
Rob. 196; The Rapid, 8 Cr. 155· Contracts of necessity, founded on a state
of war, are the only exceptions. Antoine v. l.forshead, 6 Taunton ·237; I
HALLECK's INT. LAW (Ed. 4), 582, 583.. The act in the principal case was
broader than the proclamation in Kershaw v. Kelsey, supra, and the result
reached was clearly proper. See also Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, and
In re T¥ill of Kielsmark, 188 Iowa 1378.
NEGLIGENCE-FACT THAT DRIVER. OF DEFENDANT'S CAR DID NOT HAVE AN
OPERATOR'S LICENSE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.-Statute required the driver of any
vehicle to have an operator's license, under pain of fine, unless driver was
sixteen or over and accompanied by a person with such license. The defendant was being driven in his automobile by a fifteen-year-old employee when
the car collided with the plaintiff's intestate and killed him. Verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff excepted, claiming that an automobile operated on
the highway by an unlicensed driver is a trespasser and a nuisance and that
the owner is liable for injuries caused by it, irrespective of the absence of
negligence in its operation or the presence of contributory negligence. The
exception was overruled on the ground that the breach of the statute was
material only to the extent that it as a fact was the proximate cause of the
injury. Black v. H1111t (Conn., 1921), us Atl. 429.
In giving its decision the court says : "In doing an unlawful act a person does not necessarily put himself out of the protection, of the law. He
is not barred of redress for an injury suffered by himself nor liable for an
injury suffered by another merely because he is a lawbreaker." The court
distinguishes the Massachusetts cases cited in support of the rule contended
for from the instant case. In Massachusetts itself, perhaps because of the
strong criticism by the· other courts, the rule advocated by the plaintiff has
been restricted in its application to cases involving the operation of unlicensed
vehicles and has not been followed in unlicensed operator decisions. Bourne
v. Whitmaii, 209 Mass. 155; Polmatier v. Newbury, 231 Mass. 307. So it is
generally held, in the absence of eA'"Press statutory language to the contrary,
that the failure to have an operator's license is not conclusive of negligence.
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Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725; Southern Ry. v. Vauglza1i's Admr., n8 Va. 692;
Hersman v. Roane Coitnty Court, 86 W. Va. g6. Outside of Massachusetts
it is almost universally held that the fact that the car of one of the pJLrties
was not licensed does not bar recovery or defense on the merits. Armstead
v. Lo1msberry, 129 Minn. 34; Moore v. Hart, supra; Southeni Ry. v. Vaitghan,
s1epra; H ersma1i v. Roane Coitnty Court, supra. In Brose/tart v. T1ettle, 59
Conn. l, the court clearly points out the error in the Massachusetts Sunday
law rulings which are the basis of the anomalous Bay State license rule, when
it says: "The fallacy of the Massachusetts rule consists in assuming that a
mere concurrence of the illegal act in the point of time is to be treated as
a concurring cause of the injury, which it is not, but rather a condition or
incident merely." The principal case does not fail to observe this distinction.
PARTNtRSHlP-GUARANTY OF BONDS BY A PARTN:ER-BURDJ;N OF PROOF.-

A salesman of the firm of Farson, Son and Co., who carried on the business of dealing in stocks and bonds, sold five $rooo bonds of the Eden Irrigation and Land Company to the plaintiff, Parnall. The bonds were delivered March g, 1909. The salesman had been authorized by John Farson,
Sr., to state that the bonds would be guaranteed by Farson, Son and Co.
When the bonds were delivered to Parnall there was attached to each bond
a written guaranty of Farson, Son and Co. of "prompt payment of both
principal and interest." The firm had also issued a circular in which they
"unconditionally guaranteed" the bonds. The plaintiff paid ninety-eight cents
on the dollar and accrued interest for the guaranteed bonds. Bonds without
the gua;anty were offered at a considerably lower figure. Plaintiff had
dealt with the firm before and knew them to be financially responsible.
The defendant firm were owners of the bonds, having purchased the entire
issue from the Eden Company. The cashier of the firm was the secretary
and treasurer of the Eden Company. John Farson, Sr., died in January,
l9IO, and the business was continued under the same firm name by his two
sons. On December 31, 1912, Farson, Son and Co. notified the plaintiff that
the Eden Company had no funds to pay maturing interest and principal.
Thereupon plaintiff demanded payment from the firm on their guaranty.
The firm then requested the plaintiff to forward to them the coupons
together with the guaranty. After examination of the guaranty the firm
paid the coupons due January l, 1913, and returned the guaranty. Farson,
Son and Co. continued to pay the coupons till October 4, 1916. Since that
time none have been paid. Held: (1) John Farson, Sr., had actual authority
to give the guaranty in the firm name. (2) John Farson, Jr., ratified the
act of guaranty by payment of the coupons "with exact knowledge of the
contents, tenor, and effect of the written guaranties." (3) It was not error
to admit "testimony showing that the defendant had paid three-fifths of all
the bonds issued." Parnall v. Fars01i (N. Y., 1922), 192 N. Y. Supp. 20.
The decision is so manifestly correct as to the first two points that it
is somewhat surprising to know that there has been a long drawn out litigation of the matter, the end of which is not yet, as application has been
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made to prosecute a further appeal to the Court of Appeals on behalf of
the defendant brokers. In an action on a similar guaranty issued by the
same firm to the First National Bank of Ann Arbor, Michigan, it was
decided that there was a presumption of implied authority in John Farson,
Sr., to guarantee the bonds for the firm and that the burden was upon the
defendants to give evidence as to whether the guaranty was within the ordinary manner of carrying on the business. 178 App. Div. 135; 165 N. Y.
Supp. n9. This finding was, however, reversed and a new trial ordered by
the Court of Appeals, 226 N. Y. 218, which held that the burden of proof
is upon the purchaser to show that the partner signing the guaranty had
authority so to do. This is of course in accord with the well-established
rule that the burden of proof rests on the one asserting the fact. Sibley
v. Americaii Exchange Bank, 97 Ga. 138, but it was suggested by the lower
court that inasmuch as the firm was in this instance promoting a sale of its
own property this in itself "was sufficient to cast upon the defendants the
burden of rebutting the presumption arising from the evidence and the
pleadings." J oh11ston v. Trask, n6 N. Y. 143. This argument is, however,
purely academic since the decision of the Court of Appeals, and, in the
instant case, the plaintiff has taken upon himself the burden of proof and
sustains it by giving evidence that the firm was in this instance promoting
a sale of its own property, as in the previous case, together with other evidence which it is to be hoped will satisfy the Court of Appeals. The ruling
as to lack of error on the third point seems to be sound, as the evidence
admitted "had a material bearing on the issues in this action."
PL-eADING-ADMISSION OF LIAllILI'l'Y FOR PAR'l' NO'l.' BINDING UNLESS
PLAINTIFF TAKES JUDGMENT BEFORE TRIAL FoR AMouN'l.' ADMI'l'TED.-ln an

action of assumpsit by a sales agent against an automobile corporation for
$1392.53 for commissions alleged to be due the plaintiff, the defendant corporation filed a plea of non assumpsit and an affidavit in which it admitted
$63-33 of the claim to be due the plaintiff for services performed, but disputed the balance. The plaintiff proceeded to trial for the recovery of the
whole amount. The defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor,
but the plaintiff contended that a verdict could not be directed in favor of
the defendant for the reason that it had admitted, on the pleadings, a part
of the claim. Helc!, admission of iiability for part of the claim was not
binding upon the defendant because the plaintiff failed to take judgment
before trial for the amount admitted. Standard Motor Co. v. Shockey
(Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 869.
It is a universal rule that pleadings containing admissions, which are
signed or sworn to by the pleader, are binding upon him in the action
wherein they are filed without being specially offered as evidence, being
regarded as before the court for all legitimate purposes. 21 R. C. L., par.
120, and cases cited. "An admission in pleading dispenses with proof, and
is equivalent to proof." Comzectirnt Insane Hospital v. Brookfield, 69 Conn.
l.
"It is never necessary to prove what is admitted in the pleadings."
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Smith v. Kattfmaii, 100 Ala. 4o8. In Roy v. King's Estate, 55 Mont. ·567,
the plaintiff brought suit for $300. Defendant filed a general denial except
as to $rno which he admitted he owed plaintiff. Plaintiff introduced evidence
and was nonsuited. Upon appeal it was held that plaintiff should have
received judgment for $100, for the admission in the answer that part of
the plaintiff's claim was justly due entitled plaintiff to judgment for that
amount, without regard to the value of the evidence as to the balance. The
principal case is supported by prior decisions of the same court, but it is
clearly out of line with the weight of authority which permits the trial to
proceed with the admissions in the pleading, and gives the plaintiff judgment for the amount admitted, leaving the question as to the balance to
the jury.
PLEADING-EQUITABLE REPLY TO LEGAL DEFSNSE.-A federal statute
(ACT oF MARCH 3, 1915; Jun: ConE, § 274b; CoM. ST., § 1251b) provides
"that in all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer,
plea or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side
of the court." Plaintiff sued at law on a contract for commissions, to which
the defendant pleaded a settlement and release. To this the plaintiff replied
fraud by defendant in procuring the release, and tendered back the amount
received in the settlement. On a demurrer to this replication defendant
urged that it was not authorized and the fraud should have been availed
of by a bill in equity to set aside the release. Held, that the replication was
good. Plews v. Burrage (C. C. A., 1st Cir., 1921), 274 Fed. 881.
This opinion seems to be in accordance with the very language of the
statute above quoted. But there is another sentence in the same section
which provides that "in case affirmative relief is prayed in such answer or
plea the plaintiff may file a replication." If this means that no replication
can be filed unless the plea or answer prays aflj.rmative relief, then such a
replication as that in the principal case is unauthorized because the answer
there contained a mere defense. In Keatley v. U. S. Trust Co. (C. C. A.,
2nd Cir., 1918), 249 Fed. 2g6, the court took this latter view and held that
a replication exactly like the one in the principal case was bad. We thus
have two opposite decisions on the same question, due to the emphasizing
of two different features of the same statute. The Pleu.•s case emphasized
the liberal provision, which was intended to prevent circuity of action.
The Keatley case emphasized the conservative provision which impliedly
restricted the use of a replication to cases where affirmative relief was asked
for in the plea or answer. North Carolina, in the Cons of 1883, § 245, gave
a defendant the right "to set forth by answer as many defenses and counter. claims as he may have, whether they be such as have been theretofore denominated legal, equitable, or both,'' and a plaintiff in his reply "to allege * * *
any new matter not inconsistent with the complaint, constituting a defense
to new matter in the answer." This has been held broad enough to allow
an equitable reply to a legal defense, conformably to the spirit of procedural reform manifested in codes of pleading. Bean v. R. R., 107 N. C.
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731. It is interesting to note that the court which rendered the conservative
opinion, contrary to the general spirit of the Code, sat in New York, a
code state, while the liberal view was announced in the New England circuit, which has generally retained the common law procedure. Possibly this
whole discussion in these federal cases was unnecessary, for it has frequently been held, in the absence of any statute whatever, that such a replication raises a perfectly good issue in an action at law. M'He11ry v. M'Henry
& Co., 14 Leg. Int. 292 (Pa.); Friedburg v. Knight, 14 R. I. 585; Piper v.
B. & M. R.R., 75 N. H. 228; U. P. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326;
Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Giardino, n6 Tenn. 368; l CHI'fi'Y, PLEADING, *553·
Compare Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Sperling, 239 Fed. 715. On
the general subject of equitable defenses in actions at law see "Equitable
Defenses under Modem Codes," by E. W. Hinton, 18 MICH. L. R.Ev. 7I7.
Quo WARRANTO-FORMER DECISION WITH DIFFERENT RELATORS RES
ADJUDICATA.-A proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was begun in the
name of the state on the relation of certain individuals to question the right
of a municipal corporation to exist. The defendant city pleaded a former
judgment in its favor, in an action commenced by different relators seeking
dissolution of the city for similar reasons. Held, the judgment in the
former action was res adj11dicata as to the cause of action involved in: this
suit. Towii of Tallassee v. State (Ala.), 89 So. 5I4- ·
If the former proceedings resulted in a judgment on the merits upon
the same subject matter, and the parties were the same in the two suits,
the former judgment was res adjudicata in the later action. 9 ENc. PL. &
PR. 6n. The principal case agrees with almost unanimous authority that
in proceedings in the nature of quo u:arranto the public is the real and the
relator a nominal party; a difference in relators then does not result in a
difference in the real party interested in the litigation. State v. Har111011,
31 Oh. St. 250; Wright v. Alleii, 2 Tex. I58; McClesky v. State, 4 Tex. Civ.
App. 322; Sh1t111ate v. S1tPervisors of Fauquier Co., 84 Va. 574; State v.
Ry. Co., 135 Ia. 6g4; State v. S1tperior Co1trt, 70 Wash. 670; State v. T¥illis,
19 N. D. 209; Ashton v. City of Rochester, 133 N. Y. I87; City Council of
Montgomery v. Walker, I54 Ala. 242; People v. Harriso1i, 253 Ill. 625. State
v. Cincinnati Gas, Light and Coke Co., I8 Oh. St. 262, contra (semble).
In a few states a claimant to public office is given a remedy analogous to
that of q1to warra11to proceedings, but purely to test his right to the office
as against the incumbent. 23 AM. & ENG. ENC. OF LAW (Ed. 2), 6!6, and
cases cited. A judgment in such an action is not res adjudicata should
another claimant attempt to exercise the same remedy or the state bring
quo warra11to to test the occupant's right to the office. M odli1i v. State,
I75 Ind. sn; ANN. CAs. 19I3 C 671, note.
SALES-WHAT CoNS'l'ITUTES GooD FAITH IN PuRcHASE o:F CHATTEI.s.B purchased an automobile from P, giving therefor a forged check, and
subsequently sold the car for value to D, with whom he was acquainted.
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In response to D's inquiry B said he had· forgotten the name of his vendor,
but would get the name if D wished. D did not insist, but if he had done
so and had inquired from P he would have learned of the fraud. In an
action of replevin, held, D was a bona fide purchaser and thus protected.
Hoham v. Aukerman-T11esburg Motors (Ind., I922), I33 N. E. 507.
That one who has a voidable title and possession of a chattel can pass
an indefeasible title to a bona fide purchaser seems well settled. Trnxton
v. Fait & Slagle Co., I Pennewill (Del.) 483; 9 MICH. L. RI>v. 239, note.
But what constitutes good faith is more or less undetermined. Under the
Uniform Sales Act, § 76 (not in force in Indiana), a thing is done in good
faith when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or
not. With this indication of the legislative attitude toward good faith, perhaps one should not quarrel with a court which reaches the same conclusion.
The distinction between what a purchaser knows and what he ought to
!mow is pointed out in Pierce v. O'Brien, I89 Mass. 58. In the instant case
there is no discussion of the matter, merely the bald assumption that the
purchase was bona fide. In view of the large number of cars which are
stolen daily it would seem that a buyer might well be put on inquiry by the
sudden lapse of memory of his vendor as to where he obtained the car.
Circumstances which would lead a prudent man to suspect an adverse claim
will prevent a transaction from being bona fide. Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sand£.
(7 N. Y. Super.) I57· Whether there were such circumstances would seem
to be a question of fact for the jury. See W:rr.r.ISTON ON SAI.'ES, § 62I;
]ONES ON 'l'HE PosI'tION AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHAS'ER FOR VAI.UE
QF GOODS !MPROPERI.Y QB'l'AINED.
TAXATION-STOCK DIVID'ENDS NOT T AXABI.E AS !NCOME.-Large profits·
of X corporation were capitalized and bonus stock issued to Blott and other
stockholders. Held (two Lords dissenting), that such "stock dividends"
were not taxable as "income" to stockholders under Finance Act, I9IO.
Inland Revemie Commissioners v. Blott [I92I], 2 A. C. I7I.
If the thing distributed consisted of stock in another corporation it is
clear that such "stock dividends" would be taxed as "income." Peabody v.
Eisner, 247 U. S. 347; State v. Lee, I72 Wis. 38I. And the same result was
reached in a very recent case where the shares of a new corporation were
distributed to stockholders of the old under a transaction which was a
mere financial reorganization of the corporation's business. U. S. v. Phellis
(Nov. 2I, I92I), 42 Sup. Ct. 63. The principal case accords with the leading
Americaµ decision in point. Eis1ier v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 18"9 (four judges
dissenting). Both cases apparently take the view that a "stock dividend"
paid pursuant to a capitalization of profits is not "income" to the person
receiving such dividend. The writers of the three prevailing opinions in the
principal case considered the reasoning in Eisner v. Macomber, s11pra, relevant, but relied 'upon the case of Bouch v. Sproule (I877), 12 A. C. 385,
which decided that as between life tenant and remainderman the latter was
entitled to a stock dividend. The American decisions have not considered

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
that type of case to be in point. In Massachusetts it has been held that as
between life tenant and remainderman "stock dividends" go to the latter,
~Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. IOI; but for the purpose of taxation they will be
regarded as "income." Tax Commissioner v. P1,tna11i, 227 Mass. 522. Swan
Brewery Co.,. Ltd., v. T!~e King [I9I4], A. C. 23I, which presented· the
problem of the principal case, was distinguished on the ground that the
Western Australian Act there involved was broader than the Finance Act
of l9IO, but in dissenting Lord Sumner pointed out that the language of the
Swan Brewery case was applicable to the instant case. Eisner v. lYfacomber,
s11pra, has been criticised both favorably and adversely. 18 MICH. L. ~v.
689; 33 HARV. L. ~\T. 885 et seq. See also 20 MrcH. L. ~v. 56o for a
recent Massachusetts decision contra the principal case. Parliament could pass
an income tax law broad enough to reach "stock dividends." With us the
problem is more difficult, for Eis1ier v. Macomber decided· that a federal
income tax law designed to reach "stock dividends" was unconstitutional in
that the word "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment was not broad
enough to include "stock dividends."
ToRT-INDUCING BREACH oF CoNTRAcr-UNINCORPORA'tl!D UNION CHARGEFOR Acrs oF ITS FINANCIAI. S!!CRl!'l'ARY.-Complainant hired employees
only on condition that they should not belong to or join labor unions while
in its employ. With knowledge of this, defendant's financial secretary directed
a campaign of picketing, solicitation accompanied with threats, and in some
cases actual violence, with aim eventually to unionize complainant's shop.
In a suit for an injunction, brought against the union local, defendant denied
the representative capacity of the secretary, and he professed to have acted
as an individual unionist. Held, granting injunction, defendant union is
chargeable for the acts of its financial secretary. Gyms Currier & So11-s v.
International Molders' U11io1i of North America, Local No. 40 (N. ].,
Ig2I)' IIS Atl. 66.
In the absence of statute an unincorporated labor union cannot sue or
be sued in its common name. MARTIN, THE MODERN LAW OF LABOR UNIONS,
§ 214; Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, I88
Ky. 477. Statutes in the various states have generally modified this rule,
some authorizing actions by or against officers of unincorporated associations
in a representative capacity, the judgment binding all members as a class.
Tracy v. Banker, 170 Mass. 266; Russell & Sons v. Stampers & Gold Leaf
Local U11io1i, 107 N. Y. Supp. 303. The New Jersey statute provides that
unincorporated associations may be sued in their recognized names, that
papers may be served on the president or other officer in charge, and that
such action shall have the same effect as if prosecuted against all members.
The precise point involved in the instant case could arise only under statutes
of the latter type, and does not appear to have been decided heretofore. The
defendant in its answer adopted most of the activities of the secretary as
having been carried on in its behalf, but denied legal liability therefor. The
court, however, said: "The defendant local is an unincorporated organization of men-a copartnership-bound together for the attainment of worthy
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objects, sometimes, unfortunately, sought to be obtained by unworthy means,
and in the prosecution of their common object the action of any one member
is binding upon all." For a somewhat similar decision under the English
Trade Union Acts see The Taff Vale Railway Co. v. The Amalgamated
Society of Railway Servants, L. R. [1901], A. C. 426. For dictm1i contra
see Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mi11e Workers of America, supra.
As to the general right to injunction to restrain a third party from inducing
a breach of employment see Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 38
Sup. Ct. 65, commented' on in 16 MICH. L. Rtv. 250, article in 2'J YALE L. J.
779; Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. R()we, 38 Sup. Ct. 80; McMichael v. Atlanta
Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776.
TRADE NA:MES-DE5CRIPrIVE WoRDS.-Plaintiff, as owner of a business
conducted under the name Active Transfer Co. and Active Parcel Delivery,
sued to enjoin defendants from using the names Action Transfer Co. and
Action Parcel Delivery. Held, an injunction was properly granted. Jaynes
v. Weickman {Cal., 1921-), 203 Pac. 828.
After holding ·the similarity of "action" with "active" to be such as
would deceive the public, the court declared the adjective "active" not to
be descriptive when used in relation to a transfer and parcel delivery com-pany. It was "sufficiently fanciful" to entitle plaintiff "to· protect the use
as a trade name of the phrase of which it is a part." This distinction is
illustrated by the two cases, Scriven v. North, 124 Fed. 894, and GlobeW ernicke Co. v. Brow~, 121 Fed. 185, holding respectively that "elastic"
was descriptive as applied to drawers, but fanciful as applied to book-cases.
The narrow line of distinction is shown by comparison of the principal case
with the following decisions that the adjectives concerned were descriptive
and the phrase was not pre-emptible: "Instantaneous Tapioca," Bennett v.
McKinley, 65 Fed. 505; "Imperial Beer,'' Beadleston v. Cooke Brewing Co.,
74 Fed. 229; "Continental Insurance,'' Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental•
Fire Assn., g6 Fed. 846; "Ever-ready Coffee Mills,'' United States v. Bronson
Co., 17 App. D. C. 471; "Gold Medal·Saleratus,'' Taylor v. Gillies, 59 N. Y.
331 ; "Snowflake Bread,'' Larrabee v. Lewis, 67 Ga. 561; "Health Preserving
Corsets,'' Ball v. Siegel, n6 Ill. 137; "Favorite Letter File,'' Cooke & Cobb
Co. v. Miller, 65 N. Y. S. 730; "Lath.er Kreem Shaving Compound,'' Krank
Mfg. Co. v. Pabst, 277 Fed. 15. If the court in the principal case had been
bothered by these precedents it might have rendered the same decree while
saying: "We are of the opinion that the complainants have failed to establish a valid technical trade ·mark; but inasmuch as the testimony shows
unfair competition, which entitles them to an injunction, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss the distinctions which seein to differentiate this case * * *."
Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366, 38o.
TRIALS-IGNORANCE AND INCOMPE'!ENCE OF ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR NEW

TRIAL.-Defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a twelveyear-old girl. At the trial the defendant's attorney sought to show that all
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of the prosecution's witnesses had made statements out of court as to what
occurred which were at variance with their testimony at the trial. Defendant's attorney was ignorant as to the proper method of laying the foundation
for this impeaching testimony and so it was excluded. Held, a new trial
should be granted: in order that the defendant might have an opportunity
to present the proof in a proper way. People v. Scliul111a1i (Ill., 1921), 132
N. E. 530.
.
It is a general rule that, upon the principles of agency, a client is bound
by the acts of his attorney. Thus, it has been held that the client is liable
in damages for the misconduct of his attorney at the trial. Eshelman v.
RaUJalt, 298 Ill. 192. In Hambrick v. Crawford, 55 Ga. 335, equity refused
to enjoin a judgment obtained when the defendant's attorney used only one
defense which proved insufficient when the defendant had in fact several
defenses. For a coliection of cases, see 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 524. The rule
in New York, however, is contrary to the general rule and in accord with
the rule of the principal case. The New York cases hold· that a new trial
may be granted when a client is injured by the neglect or ignorance of his
attorney. Sharp v. Mayor of New York, 31 Barb. 578; Elsto1i v. Schilling,
30 N. Y. Sup. Ct 74- This doctrine has been characterized as showing "a
fine spirit of humanity," but having "little regard for the settled principles
of law." BI.ACK ON JUDGMENTS,§ 376.
ThuSTS-CHARITIES-"~ACHING OF THE GoSPEI.."-A testator directed
that one-half of his residuary estate be paid to trustees and that they direct
the use of the money for the purpose of "evangelization" and "in the preaching of the gospel as may to th~m seem best." Against the contention that
it was too indefinite, it was held a valid charitable trust. Rhodes v. Yater
(N. M., 1921), 202 Pac. 6g8.
The advancement of religion has been held charitable both before and
after the Statute 43 Eliz., c. 4 (16o1), which only referred: to the "repair of
churches" in enumerating charitable purposes. 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (Ed. 3),
§ 701. While indefiniteness of beneficiaries is necessary in a charitable trust,
it is essential that a definite purpose and object be declared. A trust for
missionary purposes in whatever field the trustee thinks best has been held
not to fulfill this requirement. Jones v. Patterso1i, 271 Mo. 1. So also a
bequest for the Lord's work, !tu re Compton's Will, 131 N. Y. S. 183; and
for the propagation of the gospel in foreign lands, Carpenter v. Miller's
Errs, 3 W. Va. 174. On the other hand, it has been held that a trust for
the spread of the gospel was sufficiently definite. In re Lea, L. R. 34 Ch.
528; Att'y General v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. 6n. Trusts for the advancement of the Christian religion, Miller v. Teachoi&t, 24 Ohio St. 525; for
employing evangelists, Greer v. Synod, Southern Presbyterimi Church, 150
Ky. 155; for such religious purposes as the trustees may think fit, Going v.
Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107, and for extending the religion of Christian.
Science as taught by the testator, Cltase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, have been
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upheld. As the cases indicate, it is quite impossible to harmonize the holdings or to formulate a rule by which it may be judged whether such a trust
is too indefinite. The principal case is one of first impression in New Mexico
and would seem correctly decided. This is especially so in view of the fact
that the trustees were willing to act and a discretion had been vested in
them as a means for making the trust more certain.
}

WATJ!Jl.S AND WATER COURSES-No RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN MONTANA.Plaintiff owned lands through which a stream flowed; defendant, by virtue
of an appropriation duly made, diverted all the water in the stream and used
it for irrigation purposes. Plaintiff, claiming only as a riparian owner,
sued to enjoin defendant's diversion of the stream on the ground that it
was an invasion of riparian rights. Held, that the common law doctrine of
riparian rights does not prevail in Montana, and that plaintiff's complaint
does not state a cause of action. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co. (Mont., 19:u),
201 Pac. 702.
The question here decided has _long been a vexed one. There has been
no doubt that appropriation has been legal in Montana, as in most of the
western states, "probably from the first moment that they knew of any law,"
as Mr. Justice! Holmes says in Beaii v. Morris, 221 U. S. 485. The question
has been whether the doctrine of riparian rights has also existed, side by
side with the doctrine of appropriation, as in California, or whether riparian
rights have been rejected as unsuited to the climatic conditions, as in Colorado. It is remarkable that until the principal case no litigation has arisen
in Montana which required a clear decision on the point. Earlier cases have
~ontained dicta which support both sides. The opinion of the text-writers
has favored the view that the California rule was applied in Montana. WIF.L,
WATER RIGHTS (Ed. 3), § 117, includes Montana among the states which
recognize the "combined system of appropriation and riparian rights existing side by side," stating in a footnote that "Smith v. Dennijf, 24 Mont. 20,
had left room for doubt, but Prentice v. McKay, 38 Mont. 114 seems clear."
LoNG (IRRIGATION, § I8) comes to the same conclusion, citing the same authority. KINNEY (IRRIGATION, Ed. 2, Vol. 4, § 188o) says that the question is in
doubt; he does not cite Prentice v. McKay, and apparently does not consider
that it is in point. In the principal case the court takes the same view that was
evidently taken by Mr. Kinney, and holds that Prentice v. McKay, in holding
that riparian owners had rights which were superior to those of appropriators,
referred only to the fact that appropriators could not trespass on riparian
land for the purpose of initiating an appropriative right.. In other words,
the riparian right protected by that decision was a land right, not a water
right, and the decision was therefore not controlling in the principal case.
In view of the fact that the riparian right to the use of water has apparently
been completely ignored in Montana, the case is not one of very great practical importance, but it is interesting as finally determining the view of the
court on the question involved.
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WoRKMF.N's Coll!PF.NSATION-!NJURY ArusrnG Ou'.i.' oF EMPI.<>YMF.N'.i.'FAI.r, Dui" Sor.i;:r,y TO SUBJECTIVE CoNDI'.i.'ION OF W,oRKMAN.-A painter, rendered temporarily unconscious by an attack of indigestion, fell from the platform on which he was working to the ground eleven feet below, fracturing
his skull. Held, an injury "arising out of the employment." Gonier v.
Chase Companies (Conn., 1921), IIS Atl. 677.
There is some authority for the view that an injury from a fall caused
solely by the subjective condition of the workman, existing independently
of the occupation, is an injury "arising out of the employment." Wicks v.
Dowell & Co., [1905] z K. B. Div. 2251 (workman, seized by an epileptic fit,
fell into the hold of a ship); Wright & Greig, Ltd., v. M'Ke11dry, (1918) 56
Scot. L. Rep. 39 (employee suffered an uraemic fit, and fell upon the slightly
sloping concrete floor of the store in which he worked) ; Williams v. Lla11d11d110 Coaching and Carriage Co., [1915] 31 Times L. Rep. 186 (stableman,
because of his intoxication, fell from a ladder); Fraser v. John Riddell &
Co., (1913) 51 Scot. L. Rep. no (engine-driver, because of his intoxication,
fell off the footplate_ of his engine). Recovery was allowed in these cases
on the ground that the injury was due to perils peculiar to the employment.
But a greater number of courts have held that such an injury does not
"arise out of the employment," even where, admittedly, it arises "within
the course of employment." Collins v. Brookly1i Union Gas Co., 156 N. Y.
Supp. 957 (workman, while sweepiilg, had an attack of cardiac syncope, and
fell, fracturing his skull); Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 185 N. Y. Supp.
700 (fall from window due to attack of vertigo or headache); Cox v. Refi11illg
Co., lo8 Kan. 320 (fall due to epileptic fit); Vmi Gorder v. Packard Motor
Car Co., 195 Mich. 588 (epileptic fit); Brooker v. Industrial Acc. Com., 176
Cal. 275 (epileptic fit). There are English cases in accord: Frith v. Owners
of S. S. Louisianian, [1912] 2 K. B. Div. 155 (sailor, because of intoxicated
condition, fell overboard); Nash v. Owners of S. S. Rangatira, [1914] 3 K.
B. Div. 978 (sailor, attempting to board his vessel while intoxicated, fell off
the gangplank); Butler v. B11rto11-01i-Trrnt Union, (1912) 106 L. T. R. 824
(workman, suffering from tuberculosis, was seized with a fit of coughing,
became dizzy and fell down a flight of steps). The courts universally declare
that an injury "arises out of the employment" only when there is a causal
relation between the injury and the employment. Regarding injuries "arising
out of the employment," see 16 MICH. L. REv. 179, 462; 18 id. 162; 19 id. 456,
577, 669.

